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The Number and Size of Firms:
Why So Big a Diﬀerence?
Štefan Bojnec
Ana Xavier
The number of firms and their size are analysed for the Slovenian man-
ufacturing sector on the basis of the firm-level evidence of the Business
Register of Slovenia virtually representing all the firms in activity. A
remarkable diﬀerence is found between the number of the registered
manufacturing firms and the number of firms with employment. The
increase in the number of all registered firms is remarkable, but it is
less so for the number of firms with employment, suggesting that many
more firms were being registered than were in reality economically ac-
tive. The large majority of newly registered firms during the s were
firms without any recorded employment. Whilst the number of firms
increased, the number of employees declined, the average manufactur-
ing firm size measured by employees per firm declined. Private firms
constitute the vast majority of the firms in activity at end of the s
and afterwards.
Introduction
The rapid increase in the number of firms serves as an indication that
markets are becoming more competitive. As in several other Central and
Eastern European () countries, the number of firms in Slovenia in-
creased substantially throughout the s early s. The considerable
increase in the number of firms is a result of policy changes associated
with relatively low capital and registration requirements, easing the op-
portunities for registering and entry of new registered firms, as well as
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restructuring, bankruptcy and organisational transformation within the
large manufacturing enterprises, and similar processes that took place
during transition to a market economy. Overall economic deregulation
has allowed new firms to enter the markets, some of which were suc-
cessful and have been in activity for a long period of time and some of
which failed and exited the market (e. g.  ). Several new private
de novo firms have been established, and also many large manufactur-
ing enterprises were split or reorganised into several parts. The increase
in competitive pressure has been induced by the entry of new firms and
by trade liberalisation. The bankruptcy procedure has played an impor-
tant role in imposing hard budget constraints and straightening financial
discipline for exit of loss making enterprises. While some firms exited,
particularly in the most recent years, as a result of increased competitive
pressures in firm output markets and institutional and policy changes
in line with those of the European Union (), firm entry still oﬀset
firm exit (Bojnec and Xavier ). Hence, an increase in the number of
firms can be acknowledged albeit with diﬀerent intensities across diﬀer-
ent branches.
In this paper we look more in-depth into the growth of the number
of firms aiming to make a distinction between the growth in the number
of job creating firms and that of the firms without any recorded employ-
ment. Indeed, one of the most striking features of Slovenia’s transition is
the remarkable increase in the number of firms recorded by the oﬃcial
statistics in the Business Register of Slovenia (). However, there is a
considerable diﬀerence in the number of registered firms and the num-
ber of economically active firms. This ‘vacuum’ in the number of firms
due to several ‘empty’ firms has so far been largely neglected. We draw
attention to this fact by dividing firms into active firms (‘non-zero em-
ployment firms’) and inactive firms (‘zero employment firms’) according
to their employment. While the latter are by far the most important in
the , any serious econometric analysis of the firm dynamics can only
be conducted on the basis of the economically active firms with at least
reasonably good evidence for employment, financial and some other per-
formance indicators (Bojnec and Xavier ).
Therefore, this paper aims to analyse the extent of the gap between the
two categories of firms and its impact on the firm numbers and size, as
well as providing an answer to the question of why there is so great a dif-
ference between the larger number of registered and the smaller number
of economically active firms, which causes diﬀerences in the firm size.We
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look at the extent and the evolution of manufacturing firm demography
on the basis of the firm-level information of the  obtained from the
Statistical Oﬃce of the Republic of Slovenia () virtually represent-
ing all the firms in activity at any point between  and . Most
manufacturing branches in Slovenia and – throughout the s – ex-
perienced rates of firm entry that are greater than firm exit (Bojnec and
Xavier ). Most of them also experienced labour shedding associated
with an initial increase in unemployment and, in the mid-s, with an
outflow of labour into regular and early retirement. As a result, the aver-
age size of manufacturing enterprises in terms of employment per firm
declined during that period. There are, however, diﬀerences in manufac-
turing enterprises according to firm ownership. Private firms are respon-
sible for the greatest diﬀerence in the number of firms. Some of them
are part-time self-employed firms, but several of them are ‘empty’ firms
without any employment.
The Number of Firms
To analyse the dynamics in the number of firms and their size in the
manufacturing  sector, we use firm-level information provided by the
 obtained from the . This data set provides us information on
firm identification (),  sector, employment and firm ownership.
The distinctions between firms are made on the basis of the firm  used
as the criteria to identify whether a firm has stopped its economic activ-
ity (if  is no longer in the sample), has started activity ( is not previ-
ously in the sample) or is still in activity (if  is still in the sample).¹Note
that there were some cases when a firm appeared to have exited in one
year but in fact reappears later on as a ‘survivor’, with the same  num-
ber, which indicates that when it was first considered an ‘exitor’ it was
potentially due to misreported information. These cases were re-coded
as ‘survivors’. We distinguish between zero- and non-zero employment
firms. The non-zero employment firm is a firm whose employment is a
certain positive number equal to or greater than . The zero-employment
firm is one whose employment in the dataset is recorded as zero. The lat-
ter situation might represent part-time self-employed persons (e. g. also
employed somewhere else or retired) or firms whose operation has not
started or already stopped, but the firm is still in the . Very often they
correspond to firms who have formally registered but whose activity has
not started in reality. As a result of institutional changes, which made
firm entry easier with relatively low initial capital and other registration
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requirements in the early s, and the economic transformation lead-
ing to firm restructuring, spin-oﬀs and by-pass firms, the number of the
manufacturing firms in Slovenia increased from , in  to , in
 or by % (Figure ). Interestingly, the rapid increase in the num-
ber of manufacturing firms in Slovenia is due in particular to the sub-
stantial increase in the registered number of firms which do not record
any employment or the number of ‘zero’ employment firms. The num-
ber of manufacturing firms with ‘zero’ employment increased from 
in  to , in  or by ,%, slightly declining thereafter. There
was a window of opportunity, which opened and allowed the establish-
ment and setting up of new private or de novo firms. There is also a pos-
itive development pattern for the firms with recorded employment, but
their increase is more modest. They increased from , in  to ,
in  or by %, which is still a considerable increase in their numbers.
When looking at firm ownership we can only consider the firms for
which ownership information was clearly stated (Tables  to ). The fo-
cus of our analysis is on the number of manufacturing firms by their
ownership. The total number of firms is divided by ownership category
looking at the whole sample and the two sub-samples controlling for
firm employment. The ‘zero’ employment firms are those which do not
record any employment. The ‘non-zero’ employment firms are those
which record a positive (>) number of employees. We use the clas-
sification of the firms provided by the , which in the  classi-
fies the firms according to the prevailing firm ownership in the follow-
ing four categories: socially owned enterprises, mixed enterprises, co-
operatives or enterprises owned in the majority by cooperatives, and pri-
vately owned enterprises. Since in several cases the firm ownership in
the  is not clearly identified, we introduce an additional category of
the ‘not-identified’ firm according to its ownership. The relatively high
number of firms which are considered ‘not-identified’ according to firm
ownership occurred particularly during the first years of the s. The
number of socially owned manufacturing firms initially declined, in-
creased between  and , and declined again afterwards. This de-
velopment is a mixture in development of socially owned zero and non-
zero employment firms. The drop in the number of socially owned en-
terprises in the years , , and  is reflected in an increase in the
number of ‘not-identified’ enterprises. Since then, the number of ‘not-
identified’ enterprises has declined. This has been accompanied by an
increase in the number of mixed zero and non-zero employment firms.
Managing Global Transitions
The Number and Size of Firms: Why So Big a Diﬀerence? 











             
Total number of firms, linear trend
y = .x + . ²= .
‘Zero’ employment firms, linear trend
y = .x – . ²= .
‘Non-zero’ employment firms, linear trend
y = .x + . ²= .
Figure : Number of registered firms in Slovenian manufacturing, –
Source: Authors’ analyses on the basis of the data from the .
These developments suggest that at the beginning of the s there was a
period when an important reorganisation of socially owned enterprises
took place in agreement with the changes in the regulatory and insti-
tutional environment. The number of mixed firms has approximately
tripled since . It increased steadily until , but slightly declined af-
terwards. The growth of the non-zero employment mixed-owned firms
was fastest than that of the zero employment mixed-owned firms. The
relatively small number of cooperatives increased with a high prevalence
of zero employment cooperatives over time. The most considerable is,
however, the increase in the number of private firms. The number of
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Table : Number of total registered firms by ownership in Slovenian
manufacturing, –
Year Social Not identified Mixed Co-operative Private
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Source: Authors’ analyses on the basis of the data from the .
private manufacturing firms with recorded employment increased from
 in  to , in  (Table ). However, the most striking is the
fastest growth of private firms with zero employment from , in 
to , in  or by %, but with a slight reduction in their number
afterwards. Tables  and  clearly illustrate that a large number of pri-
vate manufacturing firms were set up between  and , but many
of them did not create employment. Several private firms remained in-
active for job creation even for a longer period. In , .% of ‘zero’
employment firms were private manufacturing firms. Hence the main
diﬀerence in the number of the registered firms and the number of firms
with employment is due to a large number of private firms with ‘zero’ or
no recorded full-time employment.
More specifically, Figure  compares our results with the recorded ev-
idence in the Statistical Yearbook of Slovenia (). According to our
results, since the Law on Enterprises entered into force in , more
than % of all manufacturing firms were firms without any recorded
full-time employment. In , this share was over %, but with an im-
portant decline thereafter. The , however, did not record any dis-
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Table : Number of firms with ‘non-zero’ employment by ownership
in Slovenian manufacturing, –
Year Social Not identified Mixed Co-operative Private
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Source: Authors’ analyses on the basis of the data from the .
crepancies in the number of firms until the mid-s. In the years –
, the  recorded a discrepancy between the number of manufac-
turing firms and the number of firms with full-time employed persons
who are insured at the pension and disability insurance and health insur-
ance of around –%, which is less than our calculations indicate. Fi-
nally, we provide a comparison between the number of active firms with
recorded payments through resident accounts and final accounts held by
the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Payments, and the number of
registered firms in the . According to this comparison, around %of
registered firms are financially inactive firms. This finding is much closer
to our result when comparing the number of firms and the number of
zero employment firms. These comparisons suggest that the increase in
the number of economically active manufacturing firms in terms of em-
ployment or in terms of financial transactions was not as substantial as
initially, particularly until the mid-s, recorded by the oﬃcial statis-
tics on the basis of the  based on diﬀerent (inconsistent) registers.
However, the question remains of how big this gap is between the regis-
tered and economically active manufacturing firms and what can explain
Volume  · Number  · Fall 
 Štefan Bojnec and Ana Xavier
Table : Number of firms with ‘zero’ employment by ownership
in Slovenian manufacturing, –
Year Social Not identified Mixed Co-operative Private
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Source: Authors’ analyses on the basis of the data from the .
it. Some ‘zero’ employment firms might be self-employed firms not ob-
ligated to conduct payments through recorded resident accounts to the
Agency for Payments. However, what the data appear to suggest is that
the number of part-time self-employed firms was of much less impor-
tance than the number of firms without any recorded employment.² This
clearly confirms that, to a great extent, ‘zero’ employment firms were
‘empty’, economically inactive firms, whose number has started to de-
cline since  and more recently with the ‘cleaning’ of the .
Average Firm Size
The average size of manufacturing firms is analysed on the basis of the
number of employees per firm (mean employment per firm). Labour
shedding and retirements during economic transition and firm trans-
formation in the Slovenian manufacturing sector were significant, and
consequently the total number of employees in the manufacturing sector
declined from , in  to , in , or by %. The greatest
decline in employment in Slovenia occurred between  and . The
most considerable decrease in employment in the manufacturing sector
occurred in when the rate of employment growth amounted to (mi-
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Figure : Discrepancies for the number of inactive manufacturing firms, –
Notes: ‘Zero’ – percentage of ‘zero’ employment firms in total number of registered
manufacturing firms;  – percentage of inactive firms with no employed person in
total number of manufacturing firms as recorded by ;  – percentage of active
firms with recorded payments through resident accounts or final accounts by
the Agency of Payments in the number of registered firms in the .
Source: Authors’ analyses on the basis of the data from
the ,  , and  .
nus) –.%. Since  the rate of employment growth has been positive,
indicating a slight increase in the total number of employees in Slovenian
manufacturing. As the number of employees declined and the number
of firms increased at the same time throughout this period, it is logically
the case that the average number of employees per firm declined. This
is clearly revealed by the empirical results in Figure . Between  and
 the mean number of employees per registered firm in the manufac-
turing sector declined from . employees to . employees. While at
the end of the s, an increase in the average size of the firm in terms of
the employee number per firm is recorded, later during the s the av-
erage size of the firm declined steadily. The most considerable diﬀerence
in the average size of the firm occurred in  due to the rapid increase
in the number of ‘zero’ employment firms. This clearly indicates that the
average size of the firm in terms of employment per firm is biased con-
siderably towards the firms without employment. Some of them are new
entries in a form of self-employment, while a large number of them are
‘empty’ firms, which exist only on a paper as a result of the transforma-
tion of existing enterprises and institutional changes, which made firm
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



             
Employment per registered firm, polynomial trend
y = .x² – .x + . ² = .
Employment per ‘non-zero’ firm, polynomial trend
y = .x² – .x + . ² = .
Figure : Mean employment in manufacturing, –
Note: The values regard numbers of workers per firm.
Source: Authors’ analyses on the basis of the data from the .
registration easier. Some large enterprises were also left ‘empty’ by estab-
lishing a by-pass firm.
To exclude this potential bias towards the ‘empty-zero’ employment
firms, and to estimate the sensitivity of the results, we present also the
results of the average size of manufacturing firm in terms of employ-
ment per ‘non-zero’ employment firm. It is clearly visible from Figure 
that the average size of the ‘non-zero’ employment firm is much greater
than the average size in the whole sample of firms. The former declined
from . employees per firm in  to . employees per firm in
, while the latter declined from . to . during the same pe-
riod, clearly showing that the gap, caused by the bias in the development
of ‘zero’ employment firms, does exist, but after having first widened
it has been narrowing. The average size of the ‘non-zero’ employment
manufacturing firm increased in ,  and  when most of large
socially owned enterprises were not being transformed and restructured.
Some of them continued to grow. However, the average size of the ‘non-
zero’ employment firm declined considerably in  and in . This is
consistent with some fundamental institutional and policy changes lead-
ing to an extensive process of firm organisational transformation and
firm restructuring imposed by the institutional and policy changes. Most
large manufacturing enterprises underwent a process of reorganisation
and restructuring in preparation for the process of privatisation. Later,
the average size of the ‘non-zero’ employment firm continued to decline
steadily. A convergence process between the two-trend lines (for zero and
Managing Global Transitions
The Number and Size of Firms: Why So Big a Diﬀerence? 
non-zero employment categories) is clearly illustrated for the most re-
cent years suggesting that some cleaning process is going on among the
registered ‘zero’ employment firms.
Factors Aﬀecting Changes in the Number of Firms
and Their Size
As said, the main reason for the large diﬀerence in numbers of zero and
non-zero employment firms, and consequently in the average firm size,
are ‘empty’ firms, that is, the vast majority of zero employment firms are
economically inactive firms without employment or without sales that
exist only on paper and in the . Many are private firms. Between 
and , and to a lesser extent later, several firms were set up, which
have never been economically active either in terms of generating jobs or
in sales. This gap consisting of zero employment firms overestimates the
growth of newly established firms. A certain cleaning of the  can be
noticed after the year , when the peak in the number of private ‘zero’
firms was achieved.
During the period analysed here, several changes have taken place
within the institutional and legal frameworks and in governmental poli-
cies, which have aﬀected the dynamics of firms. Among the main insti-
tutional and policy changes related to the dynamics of manufacturing
firms are: requirements for setting up firms, bankruptcy and bankruptcy
procedures, government rehabilitation policies associated with potential
state subsidies, competition and trade policies.
, ,  
 
A body of literature has developed on the role of initial conditions on
transformation, and later recovery and economic growth (e. g. Aghion et
al. ; De Mello et al., ; Falcetti et al., ). One often recorded
constraint for Slovenian firms is the delay in receiving payments and the
associated liquidity problems.³ The number of firms and the share of
employment in illiquid companies with blocked giro accounts for more
than five days was quite high in the first half of the s ( , ).
As in other  countries, a large fraction of enterprises was faced with
financial diﬃculties. While in the initial stage of transition most illiquid
enterprises were large enterprises, later on, among the illiquid pool of
enterprises, there also appeared many medium size and small firms with
a smaller number of employees per illiquid firm.
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The legal and regulatory basis for bankruptcy and bankruptcy pro-
cedures is one of the most crucial elements for eﬃcient market selec-
tion process in market economies (e. g. Gray ; Coricelli and Djankov
; Maskin and Xu ). The legal and regulatory environment for
bankruptcy and bankruptcy procedures in Slovenia has passed through
diﬀerent stages, which were largely related to the various bankruptcy
laws and their implementation. Companies’ bad liquidity position and
financial disorder were an important systemic problem (e. g. Zizmond
). The bankruptcy law represents the key regulatory environment
for the bankruptcy of enterprises as a process in which the interests of
owners, borrowers and employees should be matched. Protection of em-
ployment or labour hoarding has been argued from public or national
interest as a means to overcome the financial crisis and to sustain em-
ployment. Throughout the s some manufacturing enterprises did
go bankrupt, and falling employment appears to have been more the
result of enterprise bankruptcy than of enterprise restructuring (
). Some of these enterprises were later re-established, but as a rule
– particularly in labour intensive enterprises – they reduced the level of
employment. Among capital-intensive enterprises, they were often heavy
industry enterprises and loss-making enterprises during the longer pe-
riod in the s.⁴ While for labour intensive enterprises it was com-
mon to encounter labour shedding, for capital-intensive enterprises it
was common to have the assets written oﬀ or reduced.
Some training/re-education programmes to re-qualify and train work-
ers were developed and directed at labour intensive branches. However,
due to the relatively high wages in Slovenia – a fact that alters interna-
tional competitiveness – several labour intensive activities are still under
the pressure of having a relatively low value-added to pay high wages and
to compete in the international markets. Among such branches are the
textile and footwear industries.
   
 
The State Development Fund was an enterprise-restructuring agency for
the restructuring of large-loss-making enterprises. The Fund took over
several enterprises in financial diﬃculties for possible restructuring. In
 it was transformed into the Development Corporation of Slovenia
() (Slovenska razvojna družba – ) for the financing and restruc-
turing of enterprises that had not yet been privatised, as well as priva-
Managing Global Transitions
The Number and Size of Firms: Why So Big a Diﬀerence? 
tised enterprises in financial distress ( ). Large-scale enterprises
in the aluminium, steel, and oil sectors were included in the rehabilita-
tion process, relaxing firms’ budget constraints, and in providing them
with subsidies. The prevalence of soft-budget constraints was intended
to mantain employment levels and lead to a gradual restructure of the
enterprise. In some enterprises development centres were established or
re-established (e. g. wood and textile industry) aiming at employee re-
training and enterprise adjustment towards a greater ability to compete
on developed western markets. With the abolishment of the , the
enterprises in the  are being transferred to privatisation investment
companies, pension funds and some other agencies.
 
Competition policy may allow firms easier entry into the market and exit
from it. It is recognised by the existing literature that healthy competi-
tion increases competitive ability and leads to greater competitiveness
(e. g. Bresnahan and Reiss, ; Aghion at al., ). Unfair competi-
tion via entrepreneurial restriction of competition reduces competitive
ability and hence is a deviation or a violation of good business or trade
practices. This can be due to market power by individual participants,
systemic distortions, and distorted economic policies.
Competition policy and the protection of competition aim at allow-
ing full existence of market competition, ensuring market discipline, and
preventing of unfair competition in the interests of society, companies
and consumers. Competition policy covers both the areas of anti-trust
regulation (prohibition of monopolistic agreements and abuse of the
monopolistic position) and regulation of (unfair) competition (prohi-
bition of unfair competition), which is harmonised with  regulations
and their implementation.
 
During the s, four events were of major importance to Slovenian
trade, which have had implications on the restructuring, entry and
growth of firms. First, there was the breakaway from the former tra-
ditional markets in the former Yugoslav republics. This caused demand
shock for some enterprises previously largely selling products to these
markets. Second, a new free trade initiative developed in the region,
which resulted in the Central European Free Trade Agreement ().
This was beneficial for sales and growth of several manufacturing firms.
Volume  · Number  · Fall 
 Štefan Bojnec and Ana Xavier
Third, at the end of , Slovenia became a member of the General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade () and one of the founding mem-
bers of the World Trade Organisation (). With the  member-
ship, trade measures have been transformed into more transparent and
less discretionary trade policies. This has had more indirect eﬀects on
firms. Fourth, the widening and deepening of the East-West European
integration was stipulated by the Association Agreements with the ,
and deepened through the negotiation process and the  membership
on the st of May  with the adoption of the entire acquis commu-
nautaire.Manufacturing products constitute the most important item in
Slovenian trade. While Slovenian firms had already developed some ways
of cooperation with  firms during the old system, these initiatives and
adjustments to the  membership have further boosted and created the
growth of Slovenian merchandise trade with the -.
    
Among other government policies are fiscal and budgetary policies.
More specifically, taxation policies can provide incentives or disincen-
tives for the setting up and growth of newly established firms. Among
important measures are also policies regarding the banking system,
which can provide incentives or disincentives for firm development,
serving them by providing loans to firms under internationally com-
parable competitive loan conditions.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the evolution of the total number of Slovenian firms
establishing a clear distinction between firms with employment (‘non-
zero’ employment firms) and firms without any recorded full-time em-
ployment (‘zero’ employment firms). In doing so the paper observes a
large gap between the large total number of registered firms and the
much smaller number of firms with employment. Thus, the crucial find-
ing of this paper is that the recorded extremely fast growth of the total
number of manufacturing firms in Slovenia throughout the s was
exaggerated. It is clearly illustrated that the number of manufacturing
firms increased, but less substantially in real economic sense than was
initially recorded by statistics. The increase in the number of economi-
cally active firms (i. e. ‘non-zero’ employment firms) was less substantial
(albeit considerable) than the total number of firms thus indicating that
a vast number of registered firms were never active in economic sense
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throughout the s. Indeed, particularly great was the increase in the
number of ‘zero’ employment firms which to a large extent are ‘empty’
economically inactive firms that exist only on paper in the , with the
exception of some part-time self-employment firms. These ‘empty’ firms
are of statistical nature, closely associated with the institutional deregu-
lation associated with the transition process, allowing for easier firm’s
registration at relatively very low initial capital and other registration re-
quirements.
It is necessary to mention that the increase in the number of ‘non-
zero’ employment firms is related to a considerable increase in the num-
ber of privately owned firms. Indeed, several large manufacturing enter-
prises were transformed into various organisational units, and diﬀerent
newly established private firms were set up, which are typically smaller.
The increase in the number of manufacturing firms and the reduction
in the number of employees led to the decline in the firm size (i. e. in
the number of the employees per firm) during the s, which is how-
ever smaller if the ‘zero’ employment firms are disregarded. Note that a
recent convergence process is taking place between the total number of
registered firms and the total number of ‘non-zero’ employment firms,
leading to the convergence of firm size measured by employment per all
registered firms and by employment per ‘non-zero’ employment firms.
This suggests that some ‘cleansing’ process is ongoing among the firms
without recorded full-time employment or ‘zero’ employment firms.
With the Slovenian harmonisation of the institutional environment
and implementation of policies in line with the , the market selec-
tion process in terms of firm entry and exit is again more dynamic. Since
, the rate of employment growth has been positive indicating a slight
increase in the number of employees in Slovenian manufacturing. Fur-
ther deregulation, strict implementation of the rules of competition and
hence harder budget constraints may be expected to render the market
selection process similar to what can be observed in the developed mar-
ket economies.
Notes
. Note that changes in the firm’s name are not considered, but only
changes in the firm identification number (). The comparison be-
tween the name of the firms and the  of the firms suggests that many
Slovenian firms (about one third) changed their names, but continued
operating within the same firm’s .
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. For the diﬀerence in the number of firms, the explanation in the 
(–) seems to be a bit weak. It is argued that the discrepancy
in data between the  and the Statistical Register of Labour Force
() arises due to the fact that the  comprises also inactive phys-
ical persons, and the  comprises physical persons who have not
yet been registered in the , but have pension and disability insur-
ance and health insurance. It is not clear by whom they are included
in pension, disability, and health insurance. It is also not mentioned,
that probably the main reasons for the diﬀerence are several newly
registered firms by diﬀerent kinds of employees, retired, students and
similar persons, although several of these registered firms have never
been active or finally stopped their activities, yet the firm’s registration
remains in the . The latter argument is also more in line with the
evidence from the register of resident accounts and final accounts at
the Agency of Payments during the s.
. Inter-enterprise arrears and delay payments have been common dur-
ing transition. For example, according to firm survey results recorded
by Bojnec (), the typical delay payment period was about  days.
. For similar problems in other  countries see Hughes and Hare
(), Aghion at al. (), Carlin at al. (), Earle (), Caves
(), and Coricelli and Djankov ().
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